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Abstract 
Governability is an important concept in the political and environmental social sciences with 
increasing application to social-ecological systems such as fisheries. Indeed, governability 
analyses of fisheries and related systems such as marine protected areas have generated 
innovative ways to implement sustainability ideals. Yet, despite progress made, we argue that 
there remain limitations in current conceptions of governability that hinder further analytical 
development and use. By drawing on general systems theory – specifically cybernetics, 
control, and feedback – we interrogate the conceptual foundations that underpin two key 
limitations: the need to incorporate the numerous variables that comprise a complex, holistic 
system into a singular assessment of governability; and the a priori separation of the governor 
and the governed that precludes analysis of a self-governing situation. We argue that by 
highlighting the reciprocal nature of a governor-governed relationship and the co-produced 
understanding of governing capacity and objects, a relational approach to governability is 
possible. This offers a clearer and more pragmatic understanding of how governors and 
fishers can make fisheries governable. 
Key words: Capacity; Cybernetics; Governance; Holism; Relationality; Social-Ecological 
System 
1. Introduction
Governability is a composite concept that encompasses both instrumental capacity to govern 
and the quality of governing interventions in relation to certain standards and norms 
(Chuenpagdee & Jentoft, 2015). The concept requires interdisciplinary understanding of 
natural system dynamics and socio-political characteristics and the interactions between them 
as a key premise for understanding and navigating natural resource governance (Berkes, 
Colding, & Folke, 2008; Kooiman, Bavinck, Jentoft, & Pullin, 2005; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). 
Thinking about a social-ecological system – whether a watershed, a marine reserve, or a 
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fishery – in terms of how governable it is or how governable it can be, provides an intriguing 
notion that can potentially generate innovative ways to approach governance issues. In this 
article, we revisit the idea of governability in an effort to clarify its potential as an 
overarching analytical frame of reference for fisheries governance. In doing so, we also aim 
to contribute to an expansion of its theoretical purview.  
 
More than simply referring to the condition of being ‘controllable’ or ‘administrable’, early 
development of the governability concept is most notably associated with Michel Foucault 
through his writings on government and governmentality in advanced liberal societies 
(Burchell, Gordon, & Miller 1991; Lemke, 2007; Thompson, 2012). Recently, it has been 
described from the more focused viewpoint of natural resource governance – mainly, 
fisheries (Bavinck, Chuenpagdee, Jentoft, & Kooiman, 2013; Jentoft 2007; Jentoft & 
Chuenpagdee, 2015a; Johnsen, 2014; Kooiman et al., 2005; Song & Chuenpagdee, 2010), 
with empirical applications also extending to other natural resource fields (e.g., biofuel 
industry- Di Lucia, 2013; forestry- Derkyi, Ros-Tonen, Kyereh, & Dietz, 2013; animal 
husbandry- Löf, 2016; coastal zone management- Pittman, 2016). Insofar as fisheries 
governance is concerned, interest in governability has emerged from doubts about the 
efficacy of a state-dominated mode of governing characterized by command-and-control 
management. We have seen elements of this command-and-control management in many 
natural resource governance systems favouring the role of Weberian bureaucrats within 
centralized national bureaucracies (Bavington, 2002; Hardin, 1968; Holling & Meffe, 1996). 
Such Hardin-inspired rationalist perspective is, however, criticized by contextualists inspired 
by Ostrom (1990) and others who identify diverse, bottom-up institutional elements to be 
crucial for resource governance (Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004; Jentoft, McCay, & 
Wilson, 1998; Johnson, 2010). The contextualists leave behind the Leviathan and naïve 
rationalist ideal and embrace a shift to a society-centred account of governance which invites 
“a plethora of different schemes of self-government, public–private partnerships, 
collaborative efforts, policy entrepreneurs, and participatory initiatives” (Duit & Galaz, 2008, 
p. 327). This shift is driven by the opinion that the state-governing model is becoming 
increasingly inadequate in mobilizing efficient and legitimate responses to the complexities 
of social-ecological problems. While the rationalist governing approach is rather narrow and 
founded on a simple understanding of linear and causal relationships within controllable and 
predictable systems, the ‘governance’ perspective is broader and more nuanced; it tries to 
bridge the nature-society gap by regarding the relationships to be governed as open, episodic 
and unstable, and by not solely focusing on rules and sanctions for governing, but on how 
governing evolves in rather complex and dynamic environments (Berkes et al., 2008; Folke, 
Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005; Kooiman et al., 2005). Thus, it is concerned with what can 
be governed by governance and how capacity for governance can be built in ways that match 
social-ecological challenges, and therefore comprehensive “governability assessments” – a 
step-wise diagnostic framework for formulating a level of governability – would need to be 
carried out. 
 
We see governability as a useful concept that can guide fisheries governance, but have seen 
through practice and from studying the literature that to undertake a governability assessment 
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is an enormous task that seems never fully attainable. The noble aim of providing a holistic 
account of all possible governance characteristics and capacities through its many involved 
parts is extremely difficult. Furthermore, the reified distinction between those who govern 
and those being governed in governability assessment breaks down in the case of the 
governability of a self-governing entity, the blurred system boundaries of which pose a 
problem for the well-structured assessment rubric currently suggested (see Section 2). Such 
limitations suggest that there is room for further conceptual tinkering. What is at stake may 
be the basic notions of governance, such as the ontological position of a governing system 
with respect to a system-to-be-governed, the nature of an intervention-feedback relationship 
between them and subsequently what it means to have a governable system. Therefore, in this 
article we will re-examine governability and what it is about. 
 
An alternative take on governability is to study the processes that construct the governance 
objects and capacity (Jessop, 1997). The governance objects are those entities described in 
the natural and social systems-to-be-governed (SG) that the interventions of the governing 
system (GS) are supposed to affect – e.g., fish, coral reefs, fishers as well as coastal and land-
based activities.1 The governing interactions (GI) are about the (re-)shaping of these objects 
and capacity, such that governability will be related to how well the GS defines the objects 
and the SG enables the governance capacity. Like the rationalists and the contextualists, we 
are inspired by the systems theory and see governing and governance as cybernetic processes 
of intervention, control, responses, and feedback.2 Yet, this perspective is constructivist and 
relational in the sense that the interactions are constructing both those who govern and those 
being governed in the same process. While the rationalist approach with simple information 
and command-and-control relationship can be categorised as a first-order cybernetics, the 
contextualists have moved towards a second-order cybernetics, with coupled systems of 
complex relations that make it possible to think about designing governing interventions that 
fit specific system needs. We develop the contextualist approach into a higher-order 
cybernetics, where we see the interacting GS and SG as assembled by themselves through 
exchanges of information and power involving framing and consent. As this perspective 
focuses on mutual construction rather than designed fit or precise control, governability is an 
outcome that is continuously co-produced, always contingent and only temporarily 
stabilised.3 This article explores how this new perspective on governability characterizes the 
way governing takes place and suggests an alternative lens with which to study this process. 
The main question posed is then: Does a higher-order cybernetic approach on governance 
better explain how ‘governability’ becomes possible? In other words, does it allow a more 
analytically feasible way of understanding how governing is made achievable? 
 
In the remainder of this article, the origin and the development of the governability concept is 
first outlined, followed by an explanation of the empirical and conceptual bottlenecks 
associated with the existing concept. After a brief introduction of cybernetics theory, we 
present three cybernetic orders and describe what they mean for fisheries governance and 
how they each promote different notions of governability. We then focus on the third-order 
inspired concept to detail two reciprocal mechanisms that lead to a co-construction of 
governability. The article concludes with a discussion of the potential that this narrower but 
4 
 




2. Governability thus far  
 
Governability was initially a loosely defined (and implicitly applied) term used in connection 
with theorizing broad-scale shifts in the governing landscape of the 1970s associated with 
globalization and the crisis of welfare state (see Burchell, et al. 1991; Janin, 2007; Lemke, 
2007). Since then, a first major sharpening of the concept was delivered by Jan Kooiman, a 
Dutch political scientist, who studied governance as the changing socio-political interaction 
patterns between government and society which began to appear in the early 1980s (e.g., 
deregulation, decentralization, co-management, public-private partnerships and the growth of 
civil society) (Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1996). He argued governability to be a permanent 
balancing act, or adjustment process, between governing needs on the one hand and 
governing capacities on the other (Kooiman, 1993). A more specific formulation by others 
has it pointing to the meaning of “governableness,” which refers to being capable of being 
controlled or managed (Janin, 2007) or to “the possibility to intervene in a goal-directed 
way… by means of the instruments that are available to the central authorities” (Mayntz, 
1993, p. 13). 
 
Beginning in the early 2000s and couched in interactive governance theory, the idea received 
a renewed emphasis by a group of social and natural scientists interested in fisheries and 
aquatic resources issues (Bavinck et al., 2013; Kooiman 2008; Kooiman & Chuenpagdee, 
2005). The current formulation offers a two-dimensional characterization of governability 
that combines ‘capacity’ and ‘quality’ and envisages them as two perpendicular axes in a 
graph (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2015b). Here, capacity refers to the governing system’s 
ability to respond to the challenges posed by the social-ecological environment (i.e., the 
systems-to-be-governed), while qualities are the norms and values which guide governance 
efforts. Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2015b, p. 21) suggest that neither can be neglected, as 
“‘good governance’” requires high scores on both axes.” Hence, governability allows placing 
emphasis on both the governed and the governors, that is, it is possible to simultaneously 
consider “the aptitude of a group for being governed and the ways of governing this group” 
(Janin, 2007, p. 364). The concept also offers a strategic platform from which to combine 
instrumental and normative perspectives in governing as well as to bring together natural and 
social science expertise to jointly deliberate on governance.  
 
2.1. An empirical roadblock – the black hole of “holism” 
 
Notwithstanding these important advances, empirically, the current rendition of governability 
faces a significant setback. It sees governability as a way of making sense of the productive 
tension between capacity and needs. The greater the governing capacity, the greater 
likelihood that governability is boosted, that is, things become more governable. The more 
onerous the needs and properties of the defined social-ecological system are (i.e., highly 
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complex, diverse, dynamic and scale-ridden), governability would likely be pushed lower, 
reducing the potential of the governing system to deliver on a stated promise. An 
impressionistic study comparing the governability of three coastal sectors – aquaculture, 
capture fisheries and coastal zone management, for example, suggested that governability is 
likely the highest for aquaculture because of the prevalence of a simpler form of socio-
economic organization (i.e., owner-operators) and mostly low for coastal zones due to the 
intricate overlap of many human activities and environmental processes (Chuenpagdee, 
Kooiman, & Pullin, 2008). One way to improve governability is then to design the governing 
system to match the complexity of social-ecological system properties (Bavinck & 
Salagrama, 2008; Cox, 2012; Scholtens & Bavinck, 2013; Song, 2015a; Young 2002). Under 
this logic, governability too is posed as a property of the system – something that resides in 
the system, which is to be assessed and its higher value pursued. It follows that “the inherent 
and constructed characteristics of the system-to-be-governed … the capacity of the governing 
system to address societal concerns … and how the two systems interact” are all part of the 
essential information to be compiled (Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2015, p. 5). Accordingly, to 
fully estimate governability, one is required to examine each (unknown) aspect of sub-
systems according to a set of recommended criteria, such as the ‘degree of wickedness’, 
prevalence of system properties and ‘goodness-of-fit’ in a step-wise fashion (see Barragán 
Paladines & Chuenpagdee, 2015; Chuenpagdee & Jentoft, 2009, 2013), that is, through an 
all-encompassing and summative governability assessment framework, as shown in Table 1. 
 
With such an extensive and composite framework for assessment, however, completing all 
steps to arrive at an overall governability of a system would constitute a herculean task. So 
far, existing assessment studies have focused on one or two steps or criteria to provide a 
partial view of governability (see Johnson & Pálsson, 2015; other chapters in Jentoft & 
Chuenpagdee, 2015a). To be sure, this empirical project can, and likely will, generate useful 
analytical insights, as specific questions can be targeted about the system – whether 
governance performance, governing images or structural misalignment. Yet, it will always be 
incomplete and lacking according to the noble aims of governability assessment. More 
crucially, even if one were to complete all the assessment stages, the current thinking has 
been silent on how to integrate or “sum” the findings from each assessment stage to arrive at 
the overall degree of governability in a meaningful way.  
 
Table 1. Governability assessment framework (adapted from Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2013) 
Stage Assessment targets Features Measures 
Stage 1 Fisheries governance 
problem 
Degree of wickedness 
of the problem 
Stakeholders’ images 
of the problem 
   Existence of stopping 
rules 
   The embedded nature 
of the problem 
   Cost and reversibility 
of prescribed solutions 
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Stage 2 Natural and social 
systems-to-be-governed, 
the governing system and 
the governing 
interactions 
Prevalence of system 
properties (i.e., in 







Stage 3 Governing system Goodness of fits of 
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Scholars have observed similar difficulties in other system-based diagnostic schemes, such as 
the SES framework (Ostrom, 2009). Unpacking the complexity of a social-ecological system 
into a multi-tier set of variables has resulted in a tendency to seek an extensive list of 
attributes (e.g., surpassing 50 in Basurto, Gelcich, & Ostrom, 2013). Even when only a 
handful of attributes are involved, obtaining a holistic and causal understanding of the 
systemic interactions followed by a diagnostic approach to assess problems and solutions can 
be an exceedingly arduous task (Agrawal, 2001; Cox, Arnold, & Villamajor-Tomas, 2010; 
Cox, Villamayor-Tomas, & Arnold, 2016; Hinkel, Cox, Schlüter, Binder, & Falk, 2015). 
Although basing the assessment on appropriate theory should guide selection of the most 
pertinent attributes (e.g., as advised by McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014), use of alternative theories 
could simply suggest different sets of attributes. Strictly speaking, this alludes to a 
paradoxical situation where an approach grounded in holism is never able to deliver a holistic 
picture.4 It is inherently limited to a partial diagnosis based on partial configurations of 
attributes for explaining sustainability outcomes. In this sense, the holism becomes a black 
hole. 
 
2.2. A conceptual roadblock – an analytical pitfall of pre-given categories  
 
The empirical difficulty is further complicated by an ontological tendency to reify the 
governing system and the system-to-be-governed as two discrete entities. Despite the 
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acknowledgement that the systems concept only serves a “heuristic tool without any 
teleological, functional or reification connotations” (Kooiman, Bavinck, Chuenpagdee, 
Mahon, & Pullin, 2008, p. 4), the current operationalization has made the GS, SG and the 
governing interactions (GI) the primary assessment targets and subsequently an empirical 
starting point (see Table 1). One has to, first, search for these sub-systems and establish their 
place in the analysis a priori, as Kooiman et al. (2008, p. 1) mentions: “the assessment of 
governability is approached by recognizing this whole to consist of three coherent analytical 
components.” Categories are indispensable for making sense of the world around us. 
However, to impose pre-given categories to a field before scholars can explore it can create 
not only artificial, but also false perceptions of difference (Jones, 2009). For example, if we 
study remote island communities, we cannot consider them as self-governing systems before 
we have explored actors, practices and institutions. It is after exploration we can decide who 
constitutes the governing system and the system-to-be-governed and sometimes see that they 
can essentially be the same entity. In such a case, the governing capacities of the GS and the 
needs of the SG would be difficult to distinguish and will develop together. Governability 
conceptualized as a “balancing act” between GS and SG, therefore, runs the risk of unduly re-
inscribing dualism in its analytical practice. In working with a well-defined set of variables, 
McGinnis and Ostrom (2014, p. 8) have identified a similar predicament in the SES 
framework with admission of no clear way out. They write, 
…a government organization, for example, might appear in two different top-tier categories of 
the SES framework, depending on the topic under consideration. When an analyst is concerned 
about the actions taken by the agents of that organization, attention should be directed to the 
Actors category, but attention should be directed to the Governance Systems category whenever 
it becomes necessary to explain the capabilities and responsibilities of that agent. By a similar 
logic, the norms that an actor considers relevant to his or her actions in a given setting can be 
treated as attributes of that actor, whereas the broader repertoire of norms available to 
individuals within the relevant social and cultural setting might best be interpreted as attributes 
of the governance system as a whole. We realize that not everyone will find this strict 
separation between structure and agency to be compelling, but it would be unreasonable to 
expect that any single representation can be equally satisfying for the full range of social 
scientists and policy analysts. 
 
Despite the foreseeable merits of the current interpretation of governability, nagging issues in 
its conceptualization exist to limit its full potential as a productive means of analysis. Not 
unlike the SES framework, the preoccupation with pre-given system categories and step-
wise, multi-variable assessment has persisted. Why so? Is there an alternative approach that 
fisheries scientists and policy analysts can use to bypass these limitations? To answer these, 
we need to understand what gave rise to this preoccupation in the first place. Here, we draw 
on cybernetic theory. 
 
 
3. Cybernetic orders 
 
As part of broader systems thinking, cybernetics is in many ways synonymous with 
complexity studies or systems sciences. It came to fruition as a holistic discipline in the 1950s 
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and 1960s, whose main concern lied with the “ubiquitous phenomena of control and 
communication, learning and adaptation, self-organization and evolution” (Scott, 2004, p. 
1367). Analysts observed the application of control by negative feedback, for instance, in 
many domains including engineering, neurology, psychology, economics and anthropology. 
Provision of common concepts and terminology to facilitate connection between these 
different disciplines served a major motivation for the development of cybernetics (Scott, 
2004). Moreover, its interdisciplinarity extends to both a social system as well as a biological 
one, and the study of the governance of human systems has been one of the discipline’s 
traditional emphases from the outset (Rhodes, 1996; Scott, 2004). 
 
3.1. First and second-order cybernetics 
 
The initial model for cybernetics resembles a simplistic feedback-control paradigm associated 
with Newtonian mechanical objectivity. It refers to the positivist understanding of the world, 
which has a stable object observed by an externally positioned observer who peers into the 
system from an “objective” vantage point (Boxer & Kenny, 1990), as characterized in Figure 
1a. Here, interventions and feedbacks are not merely random but purposeful and teleological 
(Yolles & Fink, 2015). This early cybernetic model assumes that the natural world is ‘out 
there’, whereby scientists could methodologically discover this truth, and the social system 
likewise is equally discoverable and can be neatly understood, planned, and governed. 
 
As engagement between general systems theory and the social sciences increased in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, it became evident that the first-order cybernetics paradigm was 
unsuitable to cope with the distinct tendency of the social system to self-steer and self-
reference (Geyer & van der Zouwen, 1991).5 Theorists realised that some rather drastic 
changes in cybernetics were necessary. Inspired by the biological metaphor of autopoiesis6, 
there was a clear recognition of self-organizing systems; that they are actor-oriented (whether 
individuals or organizations) and that different actors develop their own goals and try to 
realize them in interaction with their specific environment and other actors. Furthermore, 
self-fulfilling or self-defeating prophecies occur in the social world embedded through 
feedback loops, creating a self-perpetuating situation that is difficult to manoeuvre or 
overturn (Geyer & van der Zouwen, 1991). These revelations pointed to the inherent 
unpredictability (and complexity) which a simple control paradigm cannot adequately 
contain, such that the truly self-organizing systems “will always expand beyond the frames of 
reference adopted by observers to model their behaviour” (Scott, 2004, p. 1370). 
Representing the second-order cybernetics (also known as social cybernetics, socio-
cybernetics, or social systems theory), this new trend brought with it two major effects. 
 
First, given that a system cannot be steered from the outside, the second-order cybernetics 
establishes a new ontological frame that positions the observer as part of the system under 
investigation, as shown in Figure 1b. Feedback and feedforward loops couple the objects 
(SG) and the observer (GS), and together they form “a learning machine, being controlled 
through adaptive processes” (Yolles & Fink 2015, p. 301). Secondly, observations are no 
longer a direct representation of a reality. Realist assumptions about external, objective 
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knowledge cease to hold, as knowledge becomes subjective and observer-dependent 
conditioned by the observer’s inner cognitive processes (Geyer & van der Zouwen, 1991). 
Context and reflexivity are the norm in this regard. Figuratively, von Foerster invites the 
observer of systems to “enter the domain of his own descriptions and accept the responsibility 
for being in the world” (Scott, 2004, p. 1372-1373). 
 
 
Figure 1. Governance model according to three cybernetic orders (a) first-order; (b) second-
order; (c) third-order. Figures on the left-hand side represents a status quo, while those on the 
right-hand side shows an idealized state of the system when the system is supposedly most 
governable. On the right-hand side, the differences in the overlap of GS and SG stem from 
the assumed system ontology of each (i.e., 1st order – impeccable control; 2nd order – 







3.2. Third-order cybernetics 
 
While the second-order establishes a coupled ontology, the third-order describes the system 
through a relativistic worldview in which the observer and the observed co-construct “truths” 
about each other and their fate (see Figure 1c). This relativistic frame is significant because of 
its ability to curb the privileging of the observer’s viewpoint which inadvertently occurs in 
the second-order dynamics. Boxer and Kenny (1990, p. 206) write that, by way of pursuing 
all-encompassing vision of the system being described, the observer “came to believe his 
vision of the second-order domain to be a domain of meta-observation”, where one obtains a 
panoptic overview. Here, the “seductive” reward for all the effort the observer had made in 
order to overhaul the conventional understanding of reality is to see himself/herself 
transcending the domain of ordinary mortal observers and achieving the holistic perspective 
(Boxer & Kenny, 1990). Yet, such a privileged position contradicts the very epistemology of 
unknowable ‘reality’ and unattainable ‘ultimate perspective’ upon which the second-order is 
founded. It effectively risks collapsing the second-order domain of descriptions back into the 
domain of the first-order. 
 
In bypassing this dilemma, third-order cybernetics offers a stronger constructivist outlook 
(c.f., Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Also drawing on relativism (Barnes & Bloor, 1982) and the 
‘relational’ approach (Jessop, 1997), the emphasis is on the co-production of governing 
objectives, capacity, knowledge and meanings, with which the observer and the observed 
come to be defined and assembled. Less concerned with coming to grips with the 
complexities of the system and how they match up in their interactions, analytical rigor now 
rests on being able to elucidate how a system is affected or re-made by each other and what 
this means for shared or converging contexts and ethics. Such an approach is reciprocal, 
reflexive and even somewhat more radical than that which the earlier order cybernetics have 
envisioned (see also Section 4.2). 
 
In sum, according to the first-order cybernetics, a governor conducts intervention on an 
external target and pursues external feedback loops (e.g., a government fisheries extension 
officer instructing fishers and evaluating results). When it is deemed most governable, the 
governor may move in close, but still remains outside of the system reality (Figure 1a). 
Second-order cybernetics is concerned with negotiating system complexity and 
unpredictability through the internal recursive feedback loops within a bounded self-
organising system (e.g., an extension officer delivering a program with fisher participation 
and contextual understanding). Here, the ideally functioning system would have the GS and 
the SG in its best-fit configuration positioning them side-by-side (Figure 1b). Finally, the 
third-order cybernetics signifies the domain where the interventions and responses are 
interlinked in a way that it only becomes meaningful to describe them relationally, i.e., one 
cannot fully understand oneself without the consideration of the other (e.g., an extension 
officer learning to master the extension material only through interacting with fishers). The 
most ideal governability scenario from this perspective would be the GS and SG cohering to 




4. Recasting governability  
 
4.1. Natural resource governance in light of cybernetic orders 
 
The development of governance ideal and practice has paralleled the progression of 
cybernetics from the first- to second-order (see also Table 2). Scholars refer to the 
conventional mode of governing natural resources including fisheries as “command-and-
control” or “top-down”, which consists of identifying a problem (e.g., a disruption in 
ecosystem services) and implementing a solution to control it. Pelosi, Goulard, and Balent 
(2010, p. 460) saw that “this type of management tends to make SES vulnerable because it 
ignores the interactions between biophysical and social systems.” There are numerous 
examples of the first-order-infused governing model that has produced perverse outcomes in 
the administration of fishery resources (e.g., Acheson, 2006; Bavington, 2010; McGoodwin, 
1990). Similarly, the “panacea problem” or a blueprint approach, in which fisheries scientists 
and policy analysts prescribe overly simplified solutions for a wide range of problems, is 
misguided precisely because it does not take into account system complexity. According to 
Ostrom and Cox (2010, p. 452), the result is “a lack of fit between programmes and their 
supposed social-ecological targets”. What many of these scholars advocate instead is to build 
a general diagnostic model to conduct rigorous research and policy analysis and to prescribe 
necessary reforms (e.g., Andrew et al., 2007). Such an approach finds its basis in the second-
order cybernetics where coupled interactions, agency and vulnerability, contested norms and 
knowledge, adaptive learning and contextual details are given due consideration in 
understanding system dynamics and effects. Resource governance paradigms that are 
becoming dominant in recent years, such as interactive governance (Kooiman et al., 2005), 
adaptive co-management (Armitage, Marschke, & Plummer, 2008), and resilience (Berkes et 
al., 2008), are arguably a part of this second-order thinking. Most broadly, the second-order 
cybernetics signals the transition from governing to governance, which acknowledges the 
multiplicity of interdependent actors with interwoven responsibilities and their diversifying 
forms of action, intervention and control (Rhodes, 1996). 
 
What would a governance approach inspired by third-order cybernetics emphasize then? A 
different type of feedback loop would occur, in which emphasis is on “merging”, or an 
assemblage, of actor groups (whether the governing, social or ecological components). This 
goes beyond “linking” through fit or networks, which assumes that actors maintain their 
discrete identities. This new perspective would be about approaching the governing of 
systems with recognition that one’s action and conditions can only be meaningfully 
understood and acted upon by relating them to another’s responses, practices and their 
normative foundations. In other words, governors’ capacity, power and success are never of 
their own making, but enabled only as much as the social-ecological system allows it. In the 
same vein, a social-ecological system’s performance also does not take place independent of 
the governing system’s vision, definition, and evaluation metric (see Section 4.2 below). 
Because of this relationality, there will always be a tension in which systems or groups of 
actors come first and matter most in governing. What is the dependent and what is the 
independent variable also becomes less obvious in analysis. 
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Table 2. Conceptual underpinning of the three cybernetic orders and their rendering of 
governability 
 First order Second order Third order 
Underlying 
epistemology 
Positivist realism Critical realism, 
contextualism, post-
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This idea of governance would be most akin to the “intersubjective resilience narrative” 
described in related literature (see Powell, Larsen, & van Bommel, 2014, p. 146), in which a 
shift of emphasis is suggested “from the assumption of distinct entities coming to the table 
and articulating differences and interests to the concrete and ongoing process of the 
enactment of realities” through engagement in joint tasks and praxis. The process for learning 
would not be simply adaptive but also transformative (e.g., triple-loop learning, see Pahl-
Wostl, 2009). It is not sufficient to just focus on accumulating what we do not know – e.g., 
new knowledge about system properties, but also letting go of what we already know and 
might feel sure of (Boxer & Kenny, 1990), such that we can allow ourselves to be re-made in 
terms of who we are and what our role is in governance. The subsequent sections explore 
what governability informed by a higher-order cybernetics may look like and the analytical 
potential it offers. In doing so, we present a re-defined notion of governability. 
 
4.2. Higher-order governability 
 
To begin, the way the third-order governability approaches the system concept (and its 
ontology) is not entirely incongruent with the second-order, in that the distinction between 
the GS and the SG is only maintained for heuristic purposes assisting with an overall 
cognition and management of the world. The main difference, however, is that instead of 
starting with pre-selected categories for the purpose of charting a comprehensive knowledge 
structure and teasing out holistic connections (as in the case of a diagnostic assessment), the 
third-order perspective would start very modest from the descriptions of governing 
interventions (i.e., actions and instruments), the effects of them and what their objectives are. 
It is from these practices we can deduce the images, the capacities, and the conceptions of the 
SG (as a set of governing objects) and the GS (as procedures and institutions involved). 
While general categories of groups (e.g., government agency, fishing community and 
scientific circle) would still be adopted in the analysis, because ‘system fit’ is no longer the 
primary angle with which to analyse governance, the assumption of discretely bounded 
entities and their finely segregated variables become less pertinent. Rather, as described by 
Johnsen, Sinclair, Holm, and Bavington (2009), systems are approached as a symbolic 
representation of relations to which a set of interventions and feedbacks are supposed to 
interdepend. The bounding and assembling process itself, which is contingent and ongoing, 
becomes the focus rather than its compartmentalized outcome as a particular category (sensu 
Jones, 2009; Li, 2007). Hence, system distinction always remains inchoate – partially formed 
and incomplete.  
 
4.2.1. How governing capacity is derived 
 
First, the third-order cybernetic viewpoint still has that governing is initiated through 
interventions and feedbacks as part of the overall system. The actors in the governing system 
attempt to govern through programs, measures and instruments; it is what governors do. They 
are in the business of attempting to steer the conduct of other actors and the conditions of the 
system-to-be-governed. The potential success of a governing intervention, however, cannot 
be guaranteed by enhancing the governing system’s capacity alone, because what 
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presupposes a lasting success, or a transformative change, is how the system-to-be-governed 
(both natural and social components) ‘receives’ the intervention and ‘responds’ to it in 
reflection of its internal logic and inertia. These “tendencies” of the system-to-be-governed 
will ultimately dictate whether an intervention was a meaningful one and is of value to the 
overall society. For example, according to Blaikie (2006), community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) is often a failure because excitement is only generated within senior 
government officials and other external groups such as donor agencies and non-governmental 
organizations, but not target communities themselves. The performance of CBNRM is 
decided by “the interests of different actors, both within political elites and in civil society, 
[who] will shape the strategy of acceptance followed by active implementation, acquiescence, 
rhetorical gestures, or foot-dragging” (ibid, p. 1951). Further, he notes cases where local 
people have only benefited when the government came to relinquish its professional and 
economic capacity. What is more, despite the continual call to increase investments, 
inadequacies in the human and financial capacity of national governments have persisted 
hindering the performance of government-initiated programs, as a recent global-level study of 
marine protected area effectiveness has also confirmed (Gill et al., 2017). In our view, these 
stories expose the deficiency of exclusive capacity-based thinking in government steering. 
They help sustain a doubt as to the efficacy of solely concentrating on bettering government’s 
action potential as well as on placing governors in the privileged position to judge what and 
how governing needs to take place.  
 
The position being offered in this paper, with emphasis on the SG, finds support in Bruno 
Latour’s exposition of power, in which a successful command results not from a reservoir of 
power accumulated in governors (i.e., how “powerful” they are), but is made from the actions 
and wills of those being governed, who actively shape or change the command in many 
different ways to achieve their unique goals (i.e., a command is “translated” in accordance 
with his/her own projects, Latour, 1986, p. 264). This view is further packaged as a paradox: 
“when an actor simply has power nothing happens and s/he is powerless; when, on the other 
hand, an actor exerts power it is others who perform the action” (ibid, p. 264). In other words, 
no matter how much power one appears to accumulate (as a quantitative phenomenon, 
Hindess, 1996), it remains an illusion; power is something that becomes evident only in the 
aftermath of being conformed to. Therefore, he points out that power must be treated as a 
consequence rather than as a property that causes action. 
 
We argue that governing capacity works in a similar manner. Deriving capacity ultimately 
relies on the compromise, consent or submission of those over whom the governing 
intervention is exercised. It is not something that can be readily stored up and dispensed at 
will to create an effect on a social-ecological system. Instead, it is obtained only a posteriori 
after the target system had a chance to interact and formulate a reaction. Hence, SG defines 
whether GS is capable or not and in what ways. Capacity becomes a contingent outcome 






4.2.2. How governance object is defined 
 
Secondly, being governable also means GS having a part in constructing what it is dealing 
with. This relation goes beyond acquiring an understanding of what the GS faces within the 
SG and how to adapt, but also recognizing its role in forming the very objects it tries to 
govern. It is about building a representation of the reality in ways that suit the intervention 
desires of the GS with an ultimate aim of shaping the conduct of target groups according to 
that version of reality. Through the framing of knowledge, the delineation of concepts and the 
specification of objects and boundaries, it involves defining a discursive field in which 
governing interventions are justified (Lemke, 2007). This is in fact analogous to what Rittel 
and Webber (1973, p. 162) identified in “wicked problems” in planning when they deduced 
“one cannot meaningfully search for information without the orientation of a solution 
concept; one cannot first understand, then solve.” Couched in systems thinking, they were 
unequivocal that when a governing intervention is conceived, this invariably means that an 
accompanying end outcome is also conceived by the GS (e.g., what SG should look like). 
Hence, understanding the particular representation of the SG as imagined by the GS, and 
governing techniques employed to reinforce it, would be key to making sense of the SG 
itself.  
 
For instance, instituting quota-based fisheries has precipitated changes in both the fishing 
sector and the relevant communities, as well as in the perceptions of relations between fish 
and society (Carothers & Chambers, 2012; Johnsen & Jentoft, 2018; Johnsen, Murray & 
Neis, 2009; Pinkerton & Davis, 2015). The newly introduced procedures such as more 
stringent license requirement and trading of quotas arguably stem from an effort to re-
characterize the fishery system, towards one that favours an efficiency-driven, neoliberal 
outlook that has pervaded many government fisheries departments and policies around the 
world since the 1970s. Here, governors’s vision of fishers is one of entrepreneurs engaged on 
full-time basis and who professionally manages their capital, time, crew and sale of catch for 
individual fishing success.  
 
Likewise, fishing and community spaces can also be made ‘legible’ (sensu Scott, 1998) by 
producing a simpler representation of the often complex and indistinct social-ecological 
patterns. Through strategies such as spatial planning, zoning schemes and census as well as 
setting up local-level fisher organizations, a new context is created for the SG, upon which 
governing interventions can be based. Once a new model is introduced, the degree to which 
the systems are made governable would depend on the willingness of those being governed to 
accept the new representation and to self-regulate themselves to suit that model. Foucauldian 
governmentality is helpful in this sense (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1991; Johnsen, 2017; Song, 
2015b); it is enabled by subtle but crafty deployments of governing instruments and rhetoric 
in a way that affected citizens assume the governing influences as their own and start to 
practice and even defend them as the co-governor. When successful, this brings their 
conducts and mentality into alignment with the governing aims and produces new governable 
relations. In the Norwegian example of quota-based fisheries, Johnsen (2014) has detailed the 
making of new subjectivities in the remaining fishers who have over time come to accept the 
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new practices prescribed for them – which were in large part induced by technical and 
symbolic governing devices rather than by overt regulations or moral policing (i.e., 
command-and-control).  
 
From this perspective, the social-ecological system is not only the constructor of the 
governing system’s capacity to govern, but also a construct that the governing system re-
creates as a governance object. With this interdependence between gaining of the capacity 
and defining of the objects in continual flux, attaining governability would imply a temporary 
stabilization of the new relations among those involved in governance. When we recognize 
that this is happening, we might say that the system is governable. 
 
 
5. Practising the new governability lens 
 
As we have illustrated, a governability concept promoted in the literature thus far, with its 
basis in the second-order cybernetic narrative, has advantages compared to the earlier first-
order thinking, but still remains burdened with significant limitations owing to its ontological 
and epistemological underpinnings. Promotion of coupled interactions assumes that there are 
separable entities. Further, system boundaries that distinguish the SG from the GS have been 
bolstered in analyses, posing difficulty in addressing situations that feature blurrier interfaces, 
including an idealized case of self-governance as well as a common instance of a governance 
participant ‘wearing multiple hats’. In addition, preoccupation with achieving fit among the 
many salient system properties through processes of adaptation and attunement, in our 
opinion, has made governability assessment itself a “wicked” task that is unlikely to be ever 
achieved in its entirety. Inspired by a third-order cybernetic approach, we propose that it 
might be useful to recast governability as an outcome of reciprocal relations rather than a 
system property indicative of the level of systemic interactions. Studies of this reimagined 
governability would centre on peering into the representations of consent or compromise as 
well as the definitional power of governing instruments, as could be gleaned from discourses 
and practices.  
 
It is useful to distinguish between the analytical third-order cybernetic approach that expands 
the way we imagine and study governability and the actual organisation of governance 
systems that follows the third-order style of governing. We do not suggest that governance 
always needs to be organised as a third-order kind (e.g., self-governance). Some fisheries, for 
instance, might sufficiently thrive under the direct management of the central government, 
enabled by efficient regulatory control and precise social-ecological feedback from industry 
participants. Individual fishing quotas based on total allowable catch is one form of 
government policy that seeks an economically rational means to a sustainable resource 
harvest, and has at times produced results that can be considered governable under the 
purview of the first-order cybernetics (e.g., see Andersen, Andersen, & Frost, 2010; Annala, 
1996; Johnson & Pálsson, 2015). The important point is that any choice of governance 
configuration, regardless of its order, will cause relational changes that have to be taken into 
account when the system is studied. To understand how a first-order-based system re-orders 
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the natural and institutional environment and how that in turn affects its own legitimacy will 
require a third-order analysis. A contextualist and complexity-driven approach such as 
ecosystem-based management can also bring about governable effects on the system (e.g., 
see Christie et al., 2009; Morrison, 2017; Olsson, Folke, & Hughes, 2008). But again, to 
understand how this new frame succeeds in re-characterizing fishing communities, practices 
and spaces and how the ecological processes and stakeholder interests come to support the 
changed relations, a third-order logic will need to be employed. Our view, therefore, is that a 
governability analysis inspired by the third-order cybernetics can be applied to study all 
situations of governing7, because of the inherently reciprocal disposition of any governor-
governed relationship. Such an attempt would help generate a different set of insights into 
how a system becomes or remains (un)governable. This possibility is presented in Box 1. 
 
Box 1. A summarized example of third-order governability analysis 
Kelp harvesting in Iroise Sea, France: Frangoudes and Garineaud (2015) have documented 
how the natural, social and governance systems of small-scale kelp harvesting in Brittany 
have interacted and evolved over time in a state of co-production. The authors state that the 
natural system-to-be-governed can be clearly considered part of a social construct, with its 
representation modified from initially one species of commercially-viable kelp to two 
species, also bringing with it an incorporation of a wider range of biodiversity concerns. This 
definitional shift has been facilitated by an integration of scientific knowledge on kelp 
species, end product development and harvesting and processing innovations. New 
possibilities afforded by these techniques then in part remoulded the socio-economic 
practices of the harvesters regarding their operational patterns, fisher organization and gender 
roles. Changes in the governance system – the strengthening and dissolution of various 
organizations such as the inter-professional committee, local and regional fisheries 
committees and a processing industry organization – also appear intricately influenced by the 
developments in other systems. Most recently in 2007, to protect the natural and architectural 
heritage of the area, a marine protected area was created with an introduction of a marine 
park authority (PNMI), which, according to the authors, resulted in enhancing the 
governability of the whole system. On the one hand, the capacity of the PNMI has been 
upheld because, despite lacking regulatory power, it has acted as a forum in which all users 
meet and discuss issues related to the marine area and its future. By being sensitive to the 
economic needs of the harvesters in addition to the conservation aims, it has secured the 
acceptance of many kelp harvesters. On the other hand, such support has allowed the PNMI 
to employ various management techniques (in turn, further securing the conservation-
oriented view of governance) – for instance, research on the location of kelp forests and the 
abundance of biomass in the area contributed to formulation of management rules for one of 
the species; and the introduction of a Vessel Monitoring System facilitated the allocation of a 
specific harvesting zone to each boat. The authors conclude that the present governance 
situation, based on close collaboration and stable relations between the fishers, the park 
authority and the industry, is a governable one, which (for now) preserves the potential of 






In sum, in first-order cybernetics, the belief is that everything can be governed in the same 
way, but with large demands on resources and administrative oversight to maintain precise 
control. In second-order cybernetics, to govern is to design a governing system that fits the 
intricate and dynamic details of a system-to-be-governed. Through a holistic overview of 
various attributes and their interactions, second-order efforts strive to assess the level of 
governability featured in the system, and aspects for improvement. In this case, governability 
holds a somewhat pessimistic tone, because in search of a comprehensive understanding, 
nothing ever seems very governable. Our examination of governability that draws on the 
third-order cybernetics turns it around and asks how governing is enabled by the system-to-
be-governed and simultaneously how governing reconstructs the world. Governing 
interventions, which many fisheries scientists and policy analysts normally view as regulatory 
tools, are actually instruments for conceptual and relational change. They do not regulate 
relations but they change them, with unforeseen consequences. Therefore, what we have 
learned from the exploration of the third-order approach is that this is not a question about 
more and more detailed and comprehensive knowledge, but a question about defining 
governance objects that come to be accepted. From this point of view, governability will be 
an effect of a successful assemblage of actor relations around a defined and agreed upon 
governance object. We admit that our perspective reduces governability to a narrower, less 
holistic issue, but conversely it also becomes more feasible to apply without assessing the 
whole universe. Ultimately, it nudges us to the understanding of how governability becomes 
achievable, that is, to gain an insight into the process through which governors and the 
governed simultaneously create governable systems. 
 
Appreciating the co-constructed nature of governance encourages a view of governability that 
is neither mechanistically simple nor contextually bewildering, but calls for a notion that 
supports the fostering of a relational outlook. It is our hope that this expansion of what 
governability represents can trigger new opportunities in informing the progress of fisheries 





1 The governing system (GS) typically denotes the various levels of government mandated to 
manage fisheries with all associated procedures and institutions but it can also include non-
governmental or supranational organizations as well as informal community groups that 
exercise authority and seek legitimacy. 
2 Cybernetics can be referred to as a transdisciplinary scientific study of control and 
communication in both inanimate objects and living organisms. 
3 Our use of ‘co-production’ is inspired by Jasanoff and other science and technology studies 
scholars’ meaning of the term, e.g., “the ways in which we know and represent the world 
(both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it” 
(Jasanoff, 2004, p. 2). We draw on this notion to support our view that governing and being 
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governed are inseparable and mutually constitutive of each other. “Co-” here verges on 
meaning ‘simultaneously’ rather than ‘collaboratively’. 
4 Powell et al. (2014) makes a similar argument about the resilience narrative running the risk 
of bolstering the traditional sectoral and hierarchical governance structures which they set out 
to revolt against, owing in part to its reliance on “expert-driven system targets.” 
5 Not all of modern society exhibits or seeks a tendency for self-steering, however. Geyer and 
van der Zouwen (1991) notes that the classical control paradigm can offer a meaningful 
analytical frame for understanding and improving the steering processes of enterprises such 
as hospitals and universities. 
6 In social terms, Yolles and Fink (2015, p. 301) describe autopoiesis as “a network of 
processes through which strong anticipation is facilitated. It enables a system to define its 
own boundaries relative to its environment, develop its own code of operations, implement its 
own programmes, reproduce its own elements in a closed circuit, live according to its own 
dominant paradigms and have operations that cannot be controlled from outside its 
boundaries. 
7 So far we have argued that the third-order cybernetic analysis can be used to find ways to 
improve governability in particular case studies. How it can be set up to allow a comparison 
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